Racine, Timothy P.

We argue that developmental robotics, in its integration of developmental psychology and robotics, has the potential to encounter unexpected and unexamined conceptual difficulties. In particular, the various uses of embodiment and shared intentionality single out certain robots and behaviors as more or less relevant for the modeling of social cognition. As these terms have relatively orthogonal histories, there is no account for how their use will interact to shape methodology. We provide a brief discussion of how they may do so. Moreover, theorists often avoid explicit endorsement of some use or another. Although this agnosticism is understandable, we use the model of Dominey and Warneken (2011) as an illustrative example of why it is potentially dangerous. While Dominey and Warneken have succeeded in encouraging theorists to adopt clearer formulations of shared intentionality, their model suffers from important difficulties in interpretation, which, we argue, are a consequence of their uses of embodiment and shared intentionality respectively.

The core knowledge (CK) account of human development ascribes higher-order cognition to infants on the basis of looking time measures. In this paper, we investigate the conceptual foundations of this account through an examination of the preferential looking paradigm. We focus on the use of this paradigm in social cognitive and morality research, which involves ascriptions of expectation, surprise, preference, belief understanding, and moral judgment to infant looking behavior. We compare CK researchers’ usage of these terms with everyday usage, and conclude that the application of belief and morality to infant looking behavior is overzealous. Based on these considerations, we argue that a developmental systems approach may provide a more appropriate theoretical framework for studying the development of such capacities.