Border Officer Training in Canada: Identifying Organisational Governance Technologies

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Abstract

While recent scholarship has begun the difficult task of unpacking the sociology of frontline border policing, literature examining how frontline border officers are governed through training and organizational governance technologies is sparse (particularly in terms of how officers are trained to interact with and form perceptions of the public they serve). This article provides the first concrete examination of border officer training by conducting a Foucauldian discourse analysis of various officer training and other documents to determine the contours of organizational governance technologies and how they serve to guide border services officers (BSOs) employed by Canada Border Services Agency in interacting with and perceiving of members of the travelling public. Findings indicate that governance technologies include training documents, manuals, public policy, and a bifurcated agency governance hierarchy serving to enable, support, and constrain BSO frontline duties, public interactions, as well as potentially perceptions. Findings also reveal that officers receive very little training related to interacting with members of the travelling public on the frontline. Officers also receive very little instruction related to how they should prioritize their disparate duties related to interacting with the travelling public. Findings ultimately indicate that when training is present, governance technologies – alongside recent shifts in agency organizational governance – contain systematic biases that produce officer worldviews and social interactions that are rooted exclusively in security provision, while leaving BSOs without the tools necessary to handle other types of public interactions that regularly occur at the border.

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Introduction

While much research in the international literature has examined overarching frontline border security and migration-related practices as well as associated public policy (see for example Muller 2011, Aas 2012, Broeders and Hampshire 2013, Mutsaers 2014, Pickering 2014, Aas and Gundhus 2015, Bosworth and Turnbull 2015, Bosworth 2016, and Infantino 2016) very little research has considered how border officers are socialized through training and organizational governance technologies. Much of this research has also not considered how this socialization contributes to officer perceptions related to border security generally, and policing and interacting with members of the public specifically. This, in part, has led to calls within the interdisciplinary border literature for researchers to consider how border security is governed as an everyday practice by those appointed to carry out duties related to it (Côté-Boucher, Infantino, and Salter 2014). Such an examination will necessarily involve an examination of the 'stories, perspectives and practices' of the agents responsible for reproducing border culture and practices (Loftus 2015:116).

When border officer training is explored, anecdotal evidence gleaned from interviews with officers is primarily used in absence of analysis of the training documents employed by border agencies to train frontline officers (see for example Côté-Boucher 2013). Identifying perceptions held by officers (especially those generated through training) becomes particularly salient considering these factors ultimately inform how officers wield considerable amounts of power that affects, among other things, the performance of national security, anti-terrorism, and other policing functions, as well as our rights and freedoms as private citizens and migrants. Examining how officers are socialized to interact with the travelling public is therefore essential

in beginning the work of 'shedding light on contemporary problematizations of security' (Côté-Boucher *et al.* 2014, p. 197).

In beginning to consider how frontline border officers are socialized, this article may be differentiated from the bulk of the border literature that relies heavily on examinations of public policies, installed physical technology at borders, and geographies of exclusion (see for example Muller 2010b, Mountz 2011, Muller 2011, Broeders and Hampshire 2013, Salter and Mutlu 2013; Mountz 2015; Muller 2016; Topak, Bracken-Roche, Saulnier, and Lyon 2015; and Longo 2016). This article will therefore build on the work of Côté-Boucher and others dedicated to the sociology of frontline border work in providing the first examination of the full extent of governance technologies designed to mediate officer decisions and social interactions on the frontline of enforcement. This article accomplishes this by conducting a Foucauldian discourse analysis of the previously unexamined Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA) BSO Port of Entry Recruitment Training (POERT) program, relevant modules from the more recent Officer Induction Training Program (OITP), manuals and other documents employed by officers on the frontline, and Canadian public policy to determine the following: 1) How might organizational governance and other shifts influence officer perceptions and interactions involving the public? 2) How does officer training govern interactions between BSOs and members of the travelling public on the frontline of enforcement? 3) Given that BSOs are required to enforce over 90 domestic policies in addition to international law, how are BSOs instructed to prioritize their duties and then translate policy into enforcement of and interactions with the public?

Literature

Recent scholarship has begun the difficult task of unpacking the sociology of frontline border policing. For example, Bosworth, Fili, and Pickering (2016) use testimonies from

detainees and staff at Athens' Central Holding Centre for immigrants to uncover the extent to which transnational migration policy impacts the migrants and officers effected by them. Others employ interviews with Frontex and other European border officers alongside examinations of public policy documents and official reports to examine the co-existence of security and humanitarian priorities at European borders (Aas and Gundhus 2015, Hadjimatheou and Lynch 2017). Pickering and Ham (2014) employ qualitative interviews with immigration officers in Australia to demonstrate how officers employ intelligence-led policing as well as local stereotypes about women and sex work in order to identify 'indices of suspicion or "out of place or time events"' (O'Connor and deLint 2009, p. 40). A recent innovative ethnographic examination considers the extent to which increasing 'ferocious architecture' at international borders and other spaces of security factor into the relationship between technology and security (Muller et al. 2016).

Some notable Canadian examples of research exploring border officer perceptions include Bouchard and Carroll (2002) examining how immigration officers use discretion, Pratt and Thompson (2008) determining how race knowledge interacts with border officer discretionary practices, and Pratt (2010) exploring the reasons officers use to determine reasonable suspicion for searches at the border. Perhaps the most notable example in terms of frontline examinations of Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA) has been accomplished in the dissertation and subsequent work of Côté-Boucher (2013, 2014, 2016). In reviewing the Agency and conducting interviews with frontline officers, Karine Côté-Boucher has done much to advance Canadian literature in the fields of border security and the occupational culture of BSOs. Several of her findings will be explored within the article.

While literature on police officer training, socialization, and organizational governance is robust, such examinations of border agencies are decidedly lacking. According to Chappell and Lanza-Kaduce (2010, p. 189), law enforcement recruits are subjected to intense socialization during training, designed to strip individuals of their personal characteristics and produce officers that embrace the ethos of rigid paramilitary-style organizations. This is accomplished by training that subjects recruits to stress, an emphasis on chain of command, and group punishments and discipline (Chappell and Lanza-Kaduce 2010, p. 189). Police academies serve as 'hot houses' functioning to 'grow a dense social network of ties within which recruits socialize one another to the identity of police officers' (Doreian and Conti 2017, p. 96). Officers receive training on high-risk, low-frequency events (i.e. self-defence tactics and weapons training) with far less time dedicated to teaching communication skills, de-escalation, and human behavioural science (Rahr and Rice 2015, p. 5). In short, officers receive training that emphasizes their role as law enforcers within a militaristic and bureaucratic structure, while instruction in potentially more progressive roles are effectively ignored or do not translate to the frontline (Conti and Nolan 2005, Chappell and Lanza-Kaduce 2010, Conti and Doreian 2014). This is reinforced through reintegrative shaming in which recruits are subjected to cycles of pride and shame, degraded for possessing 'civilian characteristics', and receive status elevation when these characteristics are ultimately discarded (Conti 2009).

While law enforcement recruits are taught a state-designed training curriculum, the presence of a 'police culture' (see Loftus 2010) – which begins to be inculcated in the police academy – can intervene in a variety of ways to question or challenge official lessons. Even within the academy, instructors (who are often former or retired officers) bring cynicism and biases developed over the course of their careers into the classroom, serving to undermine

curriculum through parables delivered in the form of war stories from the frontline (Ford 2003:88). Additionally, there is ample evidence that hidden curricula exist within formal training to socialize recruits with certain unofficial values and techniques – masculinity, brotherhood, officer network formation, officer solidarity, and so forth - that may actually be more enduring than official lessons (see Prokos and Padavic 2002, Compeau 2015, Doreian and Conti 2017).

When recruits complete training and begin their probation on the frontline, seasoned officers may inform rookies that it is necessary to forget what was learned in the academy in order to survive on the streets (Ford 2003, p. 88). Such interactions with seasoned officers serve to reinforce stable patterns of police behaviour from generation to generation of officers (Van Maanen 1975, p. 222). Frontline officers also reinforce unofficial ways of doing police work by sharing war stories regarding effective behaviors for frontline work throughout the length of their careers (see van Hulst 2013; Smith, Pedersen, and Burnett 2014; van Hulst 2017; Schaefer and Tewksbury 2017). As Loftus (2010, p. 8) suggests, officers discover the realities of policing do not match up with prior conceptions (particularly those developed in training), and officers often develop a cynical and pessimistic view of their social world. Accordingly, officers tend to develop a "we versus they" mentality (Skogan 2008, p. 26) to cope with the realities of their employment. In relation to the public, 'Officers [come] to expect nothing but the worst in human behaviour and [see] themselves as a small minority in the large fight against crime…' (Loftus 2010, p. 8). Even when well-intentioned reforms are introduced in training and elsewhere, they are often resisted by police managers, supervisors, unions, and rank-and-file officers for a variety of reasons (Skogan 2008). Included among these reasons is the belief among officers that the academics, politicians, and community activists who design policy and implement programming cannot possibly understand the realities of frontline policing (Skogan 2008, p. 26).

Some evidence of an 'us versus them' orientation and distinct police culture in terms of BSOs has already been identified by Côté-Boucher (2013). This is particularly evident in terms of rank-and-file opposition to policies developed by civilian policymakers in Ottawa (Côté-Boucher 2013, p. 166-170). Côté-Boucher (2013, p. 253-263) also explores officer training in passing in her detailed dissertation work on CBSA, highlighting how BSOs also experience status degradation and status elevation as part of the curriculum. However, Côté-Boucher ultimately relies on anecdotal evidence supplied by qualitative interviews with officers to provide only a rough sketch of how officers experience training without exploring actual training programming. A much more detailed account of CBSA organizational structure and training technologies will be necessary in order to begin the work of understanding how officers are trained and socialized within the agency, and whether and to what extent a distinct policing culture (Paoline 2003) presents opposition to lessons provided in officer training.

Methods

Every month across Canada, BSOs working for CBSA at various ports of entry have millions of face-to-face interactions with members of the travelling public (Bridge and Lancaster 2015). It stands to reason to assume that these social interactions and perceptions formed by officers in relation to the public are partially shaped and informed through a complex of governance technologies related to officer training, public policy, manuals, and memorandums provided by the Government of Canada. While examining face-to-face interactions at ports of entry is ultimately beyond the scope of this article, such interactions will be considered in future research.

For the purposes of this article, a discourse analysis was performed to determine whether and to what extent BSO social interactions are governed by training, public policy, manuals, and

memorandums. Rose and Miller (2008, p. 14) state that governmentality serves to reflect on what it means to govern, or otherwise to conduct conduct. An analytics of government examines 'what authorities of various sorts wanted to happen, in relation to problems defined how, in pursuit of what objectives, through what strategies and techniques' (Rose 1999, p. 20). Through a Foucauldian discourse analysis of documentation, one can identify language and other signifying systems that are elements in forming and shaping realities and subjectivities, which in turn render reality governable (Rose, O'Malley, and Valverde 2006, p. 89). Governmentality analyses also consider just what rationalities – styles of thinking and ways of rendering reality thinkable – and technologies – assemblages of persons, techniques, and institutions – are employed for the purposes of governing conduct (Rose and Miller 2008, p. 16).

Various primary and secondary documents were examined in answering the three aforementioned research questions. Sources included federal government websites; over 150 pages of government reports; thirty-one training modules consisting of 1324 pages of material from a late-2000s intake of the CBSA Port of Entry Recruit Training (POERT) program; various documents partially released by CBSA under Access to Information and Privacy (ATIP) requests filed by the researcher, including: 1274 pages of material from the CBSA Enforcement Manual, 296 pages of material related to communicating with the public (mostly newer Officer Induction Training Program documents), 471 pages of material from the CBSA People Processing Manual, and 100 pages of material from the CBSA Immigration Enforcement Manual and associated training documents; over 280 CBSA D Memoranda publicly available on the agency's website; and various policies including the *Customs Act* (1985), the *Immigration and Refugee Protection Act* (2001), and the *Canada Border Services Agency Act* (2005).

Discourses are powerful in that they serve to discipline individuals to adopt certain ways of thinking and acting (Rose 2007, p. 143). The discourse analysis of documents was coded consistent with the Foucauldian governmentality perspective (Foucualt 1991, Gordon 1991, Rose 1999, Rose and Miller 2008) while also attempting to answer the three key research questions, and coding was therefore 'driven by the researcher's theoretical or analytical interest' (Braun and Clarke 2006, p. 84).

Findings

CBSA Organizational Shifts

Canada Border Services Agency serves as an excellent microcosm of similar governance shifts experienced in other policing agencies over the course of the past two centuries. In the case of CBSA, however, changes in organizational governance have occurred at an accelerated pace largely over the course of the past three decades. As such, CBSA serves as the perfect agency for exemplifying the importance of considering shifts in governance as a factor potentially influencing officers' interactions with and perceptions of the public, as well as shifting enforcement priorities on the frontline.

Côté-Boucher (2013, pp. 96-102) citing McIntosh (1984) provides an excellent examination of the early history of border security in Canada from the 19th century onward, charting a progression from British-appointed officials policing Canadian ports, the formation of a customs department after Confederation in 1867, and the establishment of the Department of National Revenue in 1927 (which ultimately served as the forbearer of the short-lived Canada Customs and Revenue Agency in 1999). This article will focus primarily on the (comparatively) fast-pace changes of the past three decades.

As a way of introduction, prior to 1992 and the signing of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), customs officers largely served revenue collection functions through enforcement of taxation on goods at the Canadian border. An audit of the Department of National Revenue performed in 1928 highlighted concerns surrounding commercial smuggling and tax and duty fraud, and indicated a troublesome start for the Department in terms of prevention in that:

> A considerable number of the officers appeared to be apathetic to individual smuggling, and made no serious effort to prevent same. Their conduct would indicate that they had a misconception of their duties… [and] acted as if their sole duty was to receive entries and payment of duties by those willing to pay same' (Royal Commission on Customs and Excise 1928, p. 18).

A government publication later on in the 20th Century indicates that officers eventually embraced a preventative role, and states that:

> [Officers] collect revenue, a traditional function that predates Confederation. They also protect the nation's industry against injurious foreign competition. And, finally, they guard in many ways, its people's health, welfare and environment, serving as a first line of defence in these matters on behalf of other government departments (Revenue Canada Customs and Excise 1978, p. 2).

While the document also mentions that officers intercept narcotics, most policing activities are defined in relation to protecting the marketplace against fraudulent goods, pornography, obscene publications, cars not meeting Canadian standards (Revenue Canada Customs and Excise 1978, p. 10), as well as 'liquor, furs, electrical appliances, rings, watches, jewellery, firearms, golf equipment and riding tack… and commercial fraud' (1978, p. 16).

After the adoption of NAFTA and the subsequent diminished capacity of customs officers to collect revenue, it became more common for the Government of Canada to promote the border enforcement activities of officers as the 'first line of defence against drugs, contraband, and illegal firearms' (Pratt 2005, p. 191). Côté-Boucher (2013) points to the 1995

Canada-United States Accord on Our Shared Borders as the first agreement in North America demonstrating a concrete link between liberalizing trade and the necessity to tighten 'controls for illegitimate flows of commodities and persons smuggled through the same border' (p. 110). Accordingly, 'The agreement portrayed the signatories as facing "external threats related to international terrorism, transnational crime, and drug and people smuggling" and endeavoured to coordinate immigration, customs and intelligence agencies in order to confront those threats' (Côté-Boucher 2013, p. 110). In May 1997, the passage of Bill C-18, *An Act to Amend the Customs Act and Criminal Code*, designated customs officers for the first time as 'peace officers,' allowing them to enforce the *Criminal Code of Canada* and to serve as the 'first response' to criminal and dangerous people seeking entry into Canada (Pratt 2005, p. 192).

In the wake of the terrorist attacks of September 11th, 2001, the 2001 Canada-U.S. Smart Border Declaration further entrenched the border as a space of security, and border agencies as responsible for facilitating the free movement of low-risk individuals and commodities while identifying and pre-empting potential security threats before they arrived in North America (Côté-Boucher 2013, p. 111). In 2004, Bill C-24, *The Canada Border Services Agency Act*, established Canada Border Services Agency as a legal entity and transferred to it several additional powers from its three legacy agencies: the Canada Customs and Revenue Agency (CCRA), Citizenship and Immigration Canada (CIC), and the Canadian Food Inspection Agency (CFIA) (Parliament of Canada 2004). Officers now called 'border services officers' (BSOs) became responsible for enforcing over 90 domestic acts and regulations as well as international agreements governing travel and trade. BSOs were also provided with handcuffs, pepper spray, batons, protective vests, as well as use-of-force training (CBSA 2008a). In 2006 the Government of Canada announced that it would begin arming BSOs with firearms. The rationale provided

was, 'Armed officers are better prepared and trained to deal with a broader range of options when responding to potentially dangerous situations' (CBSA 2011).

Other agreements with the United States – including the (abandoned) 2006 Security and Prosperity Partnership and the 2011 U.S.-Canada Beyond the Border Action Plan: A Shared Vision for Perimeter Security and Economic Competitiveness – further established the relationship between liberalized trade and the mandate of border security agencies to identify and pre-empt potential security threats (Côté-Boucher 2013, p. 111). In 2007, the Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative, requiring all travellers to the United States (including Canadians) to present passports or other secure documents, furthered this relationship tangentially in Canada. A CBSA publication from 2008 highlights a focus on security, emphasizing pre-approval (risk-based) programs for businesses and individuals (Customs Self Assessment, Free and Secure Trade, Partners in Protection, CANPASS Air), receiving advanced information to stop threats and facilitate 'legitimate' travel and trade (Advanced Passenger Information / Passenger Name Record, Advanced Commercial Information, eManifest, Container Security Initiative), developing intelligence and conducting risk analyses, and innovating the border for the future (biometrics, marine drones, vehicle x-ray equipment, spectrometry equipment, radiation detection technology, detector dogs, and so forth) (CBSA 2008b). The document clearly illustrates that security is now promoted as the primary mandate of BSOs and CBSA, with 'Trade and Revenue Administration' mentioned as a half-page afterthought at the conclusion of the 23-page document (a stark contrast with the aforementioned 1928 audit and 1978 agency documents almost exclusively focused on trade and revenue).

In the post-NAFTA era of border security (and particularly since 9/11) Canada has also experienced a diffusion of border security responsibilities. This shift has been well-documented

in relation to Canadian, U.S., and European borders in the literature in terms of: 1) exploring 'smart borders' (see Amoore, Marmura, and Salter 2008; Côté-Boucher 2008; Topak *et al.* 2015), including examinations of travel documents (Lyon 2009, Salter 2011, McPhail *et al.* 2012), the use of biometrics and other risk technologies (Epstein 2007, Muller 2010a, Muller 2011, Aas 2012, Bigo 2014), as well as databases and computerization more generally (Broeders and Hampshire 2013); 2) examinations of border geospatiality (or lack thereof), including logics of 'remote control' (Broeders and Hampshire 2013), deterritoralization (Mountz 2011, Salter and Mutlu 2013, Mountz and Loyd 2014), the border as 'everywhere' (Lyon 2005), the border as part of a continuum also including other enforcement locales (Vaughan-Williams 2010), and as a form of visual 'security performance' (Rumford 2006, deLint 2008) pushing security functions 'beyond the border' away from their traditional geographical limits. In terms of the Canadian experience, this shift has been accomplished via the deployment of a variety of government, law enforcement, and private security actors alongside CBSA in sharing responsibility for border security (Côté-Boucher 2013, p. 93). Additionally, CBSA has focused on employing 'smart borders' in moving border governance beyond its traditional geographical limits, and using data collection methods such as trusted traveler and trading programs that shift responsibility for border security upstream to private actors including commercial carriers and individuals (Côté-Boucher 2013, p. 93).

It is apparent that over time, CBSA has developed from a department that focused largely on tax collection and facilitating trade to an agency that deals (at least in principle) primarily in national security, criminal enforcement, and intelligence. During this time, and as a result of the aforementioned changes in organizational governance, officers have undoubtedly shifted their enforcement priorities and thus also their perceptions of the public. Over the span of three

decades, officers potentially worked first as revenue collection agents within the context of borders primarily focused on governing and taxing international trade (pre-1992), secondly as 'facilitator agents' at borders primarily focused on liberalized trade and the (relative) free movement of all people and goods (from 1992 until about 1997), and finally as peace officers employed at borders focused upon identifying, pre-empting, and interrupting potential and real security threats while permitting the movement of designated low-risk people and goods (after 1997 and accelerated after 2001). As officers were progressively equipped with the tools necessary to handle various 'security moments' (defensive equipment, firearms, enabling legislation, technology, databases, and so forth) they were simultaneously also trained to deal with a travelling public increasingly characterized as dangerous, unpredictable, and requiring securitization. This undoubtedly contributed to a shift in officer 'worldview' (Heyman 1995) over time, from one focused on enforcing a tax-paying public to one ultimately focused on enforcing a criminal and terroristic public.

Identifying the BSO Training and Governance Technologies

With aforementioned organizational shifts in mind, this article will provide an in-depth analysis of the actual training technologies employed at the CBSA training facility. Beginning in 1977, the Customs and Excise College opened in Ottawa to provide officers with a 13-week course designed to train officers 'in a variety of disciplines, [as] protectors of Canadian jobs and front-line guardians against harmful products, illegal practices and criminal elements, each of which poses a special threat of economics, health, welfare and environmental' (Revenue Canada Customs and Excise 1978, p. 18). CBSA recruits (beginning in 2014) now complete a 5-week online orientation learning component (phase one) followed by an 18-week intensive training program in Rigaud, Quebec (phase two). Now called the Officer Induction Training Program

(OITP), recruits learn how to understand and apply relevant policies, procedures, and legislation pursuant to their job; identify appropriate systems for such policies, procedures, and legislation; develop information seeking techniques; perform primary and secondary inspection for immigration, food, plant and animal products, as well as other customs programs; demonstrate control and defensive (self-defence and use-of-force) tactics; demonstrate firearm skills; and conduct arrests, seizures, detentions, and personal searches and provide grounds for such actions (CBSA 2016b).

For the purposes of this article, obtained documents pertaining to the now-defunct Port of Entry Recruitment Training (POERT) program are still applicable for two primary reasons. Firstly, the new OITP is built on the foundation of POERT and adds the duty firearm training component on the foundation of POERT training while also incorporating applicable policy changes. Secondly, according to CBSA corporate documents, the vast majority of BSOs currently on the frontline were likely trained using iterations of the late-2000s POERT documents obtained by the researcher given that CBSA increased its frontline ranks from 4000 to 7200 officers from 2006 to 2012 – representing an 80% increase overall – prior to the implementation of the new OITP in 2014 (CBSA 2008a, CBSA 2016a).[1] In short, in addition to serving as training documents for the majority of current frontline BSOs, the POERT documents also provide a representative snapshot of the current OITP. Modules from the more recent OITP pertaining to how officers should or must interact or communicate with members of the travelling public were eventually made available (in part) to the researcher after filing an ATIP request with CBSA. These documents shed some additional light on how new recruits are trained.

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[1] The most recent data gleaned from the 2013-2014 Annual Report to Parliament on *the Privacy Act* (CBSA 2014a) suggests that there are "over 7200" officers, and the 2014-2015 Departmental Performance Report (CBSA 2015) states that there are 7297 full-time officers.

POERT documents indicate that the majority of current frontline BSOs were specifically trained on 31 unique modules pertaining to the requirements of their job, including (but not limited to) immigration categories and immigration enforcement; primary inspection; secondary inspection; indicators; firearms; and customs and *Criminal Code* arrest, detention, and personal searches. Depending on the module, BSOs are expected to acquire specific combinations of eleven unique competencies, including: 1) client service orientation; 2) supporting CBSA values; 3) analytical thinking; 4) dealing with difficult situations; 5) effective interactive communication; 6) self-confidence; 7) information seeking skills; 8) legislation, policies, and procedures; 9) inspection techniques; 10) decisiveness; and 11) agency business systems. During training, officers are also referred to a variety of other documents to supplement information contained in POERT training documents, including the Customs Enforcement Manual, the Immigration Enforcement Manual, the CBSA People Processing Manual, the *Customs Tariff*, the *Customs Act*, the *Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA)*, the *Criminal Code of Canada*, the *Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms*, and CBSA D Memoranda, as well as online intranet material regarding firearms. Together, these documents (and aforementioned POERT training) serve as governance technologies designed to regulate officer duties and activities on the frontline while purportedly providing officers with the eleven competencies mentioned above.

Interestingly, some governance technologies are prioritized over others. For instance, Part 5 Chapter 3 of the Customs Enforcement Manual states:

> The primary responsibility of all customs officers remains the enforcement and application of the *Customs Act* and its regulations as well as the laws of other government departments (OGDs) for which it has responsibility.

> The *Customs Act* will take precedent over the *Criminal Code* in matters dealing with *in personam* offences concerning the importation, exportation, or possession of imported/exported goods (p. 2).

While BSOs are to some extent both enabled and restricted as peace officers by provisions in the *Criminal Code*, the above passage highlights the fact that the *Customs Act* serves as the most important enabling legislation in terms of BSO duties. This notion is repeatedly reinforced in POERT documents with frequent references to sections of the *Customs Act* that enable officers in certain duties. Secondly, POERT training documents make frequent reference to sections of *IRPA,* allowing officers to conduct immigration-related duties and enforcement at the border. The *Customs Act* and *IRPA* are therefore the two most important sources governing the actions of BSOs on the frontline.

Other sources mentioned above (Customs Enforcement Manual, Immigration Enforcement Manual, CBSA People Processing Manual, and CBSA D Memoranda) largely serve as 'reference manuals' detailing policies and standard operating procedures enabled under the *Customs Act* and *IRPA.* These serve as secondary sources governing officer activities and reproduce much of the same material BSOs cover in training. Particularly, the Customs Enforcement Manual contains over thirty independent lists referencing officer duties pertaining to disparate enforcement activities ranging from illicit drugs to firearms to child pornography. Additionally, the *Customs Tariff* contains rules for classifying the importation of commercial and other goods based on the World Customs Organization's (WCO) Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding System, and governs officer activities only peripherally given this process is now largely automated and given the onus for proper reporting often falls on the importer (CBSA 2014b). BSOs, like all peace officers in Canada, are also governed by the *Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms*, necessitating officers perform duties while

respecting rights related to unreasonable search and seizure (s. 8), arbitrary detention or imprisonment (s. 9), access to legal counsel (s. 10), and so forth. Rounding out the bottom of the hierarchy of governance documents, officers also draw on over 90 domestic policies in addition to international law, including for instance the *Foreign Missions and International Organizations Act (1991)*, the *Youth Criminal Justice Act (2002)*, the *Anti-Terrorism Act (2001)*, and the *Public Safety Act (2002)*.

Organizational Governance Hierarchy

While it is true that officers operate with relative autonomy on the frontline of enforcement commensurate to their training as well as aforementioned enabling legislation, CBSA does maintain an organizational governance hierarchy that serves to govern its employees. CBSA is located within the Public Safety Canada portfolio. It is subject to Acts of Parliament and led by the Minister of Public Safety, the Deputy Minister of Public Safety, and the Associate Deputy Minister. Alongside CBSA, other policing and security departments governed within the Public Safety portfolio include the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS), Correctional Services Canada (CSC), the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), and the National Parole Board. CBSA is constructed as a bifurcated governance structure, comprised of: 1) a strong, centralized, national governance hierarchy that provides policies, programming, and operational support across Canada, and 2) a regional paramilitary-style governance hierarchy administering federal policies and programs while serving to govern frontline operations at ports of entry.

CBSA is headed by an executive consisting of a president and executive vice president. The organization is made up of six branches and one group reporting directly to the president, including: 1) Comptrollership, 2) Corporate Affairs, 3) Human Resources, 4) Information,

Science and Technology, 5) Operations, 6) Programs, and the Internal Audit and Program Evaluation group. Each branch is divided into various divisions generally headed by directors of the organization. Divisions are broken down into sub-divisions or groups usually led by a manager.

The comptrollership and corporate affairs branches house the accounting, finance, and organizational functions of the Agency. The daily work lives of BSOs are influenced in a greater way by subsequent branches. The Human Resources Branch, for instance, contains ten divisions and thirty-three sub-divisions concerned with human resourcing, labour relations, occupation health and safety, recruitment and professional development, employee learning, and administers the Employee Assistance Program (EAP), the Mental Health Program, the Internal Conflict Management System (ICMS), the Office of Values and Ethics, and the Arming Division.

The Information, Science, and Technology Branch greatly influences the frontline activities of BSOs. The branch is composed of twenty-six divisions and 136 sub-divisions responsible for administering the information technology as well as scientific and other technological tools of the entire agency. This includes electronic systems and databases frequently used by officers on a daily basis such as eManifest, Accelerated Commercial Release Operations Support System (ACROSS), immigration systems, query systems, intelligence and investigation systems, and trusted traveler enrollment and passage systems (NEXUS, FAST, and so forth). This branch also administers technologies (such as ionizers) used by officers to swab and scan substances, surfaces, commodities, conveyances, and individuals for trace amounts of narcotics and explosives (CBSA 2015).

Operations Branch consists of ten divisions and twenty-one sub-divisions, overseeing essentially every aspect of BSO frontline duties ranging from clearing commercial goods,

processing travelers, seizing illicit or banned commodities, laying Customs Act and/or Criminal Code charges, issuing deportation orders, and so forth. Operations Branch also administers the Criminal Investigations Division, the Inland Enforcement Operations and Case Management Division, the Intelligence Operations and Analysis Division, and the CBSA Warrant Response Centre, which all provide operational support, intelligence, and analysis to support frontline officers. Programs Branch similarly administers and supports various core pre-border, at-border, and post-border programs administered by the Agency. This includes, for instance, advanced commercial processing, postal processing, and trusted traveler and trader programs (including airline compliance, stakeholder engagement and outreach, and traveller compliance).

In total, the CBSA national governance structure consists of (at least) 97 total divisions and 347 sub-divisions, led by 92 directors and 287 managers and staffed by a variety of employees including (but not limited to): policy analysts, team leaders, financial officers, web developers, ATIP processing officers, human resources analysts, learning specialists, forensic chemists, legal counsellors, and program officers. In short, CBSA consists of a strong, centralized, non-paramilitary-style, nationalized bureaucratic governance structure that greatly influences policies, procedures, and technologies governing officers on the frontline.

CBSA also consists of a localized governance structure divided into seven regions across Canada. These include the Atlantic Region, Greater Toronto Area Region, Northern Ontario Region, Pacific Region, Prairie Region, Quebec Region, and the Southern Ontario Region. Regions are generally headed by a combination of a regional director general, an executive director, and other directors. Regional governance structures are generally divided into a local office (or offices) within particular regions providing regional support for policies and programs provided by the centralized national governance structure outlined above. Regions are then

divided into various ports of entry or groups of ports of entry. Ports of entry include land, marine, and air ports where BSOs process travellers on a daily basis. Port operations (unlike the national governance structure) are governed by a more traditional paramilitary-style policing structure. Ports are generally headed by combinations of directors and chiefs of operations. Superintendents serve as middle-management supervising frontline officers and ensuring day-to-day operations reflect national policy. Trainers also exist to provide regional training functions to frontline officers. At the bottom of the hierarchy is frontline staff. This includes border services officers, hearings advisors, hearings officers, inland enforcement officers, intelligence officers, and investigators.

It may be concluded that a combination of officer training, legislation, standard operating procedures found in manuals, a centralized national bureaucratic governance structure, and a paramilitary-style regional governance hierarchy featuring numerous actors and operational divisions serve to enable, support, and constrain BSO frontline duties and activities. Future research will need to consider how and the extent to which this unique bifurcated governance structure serves to influence officers on the frontline. Initial research by Côté-Boucher (2013, pp. 166-167) suggests a palpable tension between officers on the frontline and the (perceived) bureaucrats of the national governance structure (Ottawa). Such findings are consistent with findings from the policing literature regarding the presence of an "us versus them" mentality, including resistance to the policy work of politicians, academics, and so forth (Skogan 2008). Further analysis and qualitative interviews with officers will also need to consider the extent to which officers are able to form collective perceptions and behaviour independent of the governance efforts (namely how training differs from practice). Finally, future research will need to examine how these governance technologies are (en)folded into existing frontline governance

structures, namely, the 'zone of frontier government' (O'Connor and de Lint 2009, p. 40) characterized by the exercise of sovereignty as well as strategies of control, surveillance, and risk management as overarching border frameworks.

Identifying Frontline Priorities

Given that BSOs are required to enforce over 90 domestic policies in addition to international law, how are BSOs instructed through training and the other governance technologies highlighted above to prioritize duties and then translate policy into enforcement of members of the travelling public? An analysis of POERT documents resulted in seven instances of prioritization for BSOs within the thirty-one training modules. This primarily included text identifying a certain duty as 'important' in the introduction to a training module. For instance, the introduction to the Controlled Drugs and Substances module indicates, 'One of the top priorities of CBSA is the interdiction of controlled drugs and substances' (p. v). Similarly, a module on Inadmissible Categories states in the introduction, 'Knowing which foreign nations and which permanent residents are inadmissible is central to the role of a border services officer' (p. 1). In addition to these modules, the Temporary Residents, People at Risk, Examination of Goods, Duties and Taxes, and Refugee Determination System modules are also prioritized in training.

The *Canada Border Services Agency Act* (2005) enables Canada Border Services Agency as a department of the Government of Canada and sets out priorities in s. 5(1) by stating:

> The Agency is responsible for providing integrated border services that support
> national security and public safety priorities and facilitate the free flow of
> persons and goods, including animals and plants that meet all requirements
> under the program legislation… (p. 2).

Part 1 Chapter 1 of the Customs Enforcement Manual similarly discusses enforcement priorities, stating:

> In order to make effective use of our enforcement resources, the focus of our enforcement activity is directed at prohibited goods (i.e. narcotics, pornography, weapons), counter-terrorism, export control, commercial fraud, and other identified areas of high risk (p. 3).

Part 2 Chapter 3 regarding Firearms and Weapons indicates, 'Firearms and weapons are high-risk commodities and their interdiction is therefore a CBSA enforcement priority' (p. 4). Similarly, Part 2 Chapter 6 entitled 'Drugs and Precursor Chemicals' states, 'Drugs are a high-risk commodity and the interdiction of illegal drugs is therefore a CBSA enforcement priority' (p. 6). Part 2 Chapter 14 entitled 'Child Pornography' makes a distinction between obscene material and child pornography, mandating that in cases where officers find both that BSOs give priority to dealing with the child pornography first given that possession is a serious *Criminal Code* offense (p. 12).

It can therefore be concluded that prioritization ultimately serves to 'securitize' certain aspects of BSO duties, including duties primarily related to banned commodities and goods, immigration enforcement, criminal activities, and, to a lesser extent, the payment of duties and taxes, representing only a small fraction of all possible duties enabled through the multitude of policies and laws enforced by CBSA. It is not without coincidence that the prioritized duties are largely enabled by identified primary legislation, namely the *Customs Act*, *IRPA*, and to a lesser extent the *Criminal Code*.

It can also be concluded from this analysis that officers receive very few instructions in training or within manuals and public policy regarding what specifically should be prioritized in practice, meaning officers are likely to cope with vague instruction by identifying and forming collective perceptions regarding what constitutes a priority on the job. As the aforementioned policing literature suggests, priorities are likely negotiated through officer socialization in terms of informal training mechanisms, recruit and officer social networks formed during training, and

continuing officer socialization and network formation throughout the course of a career (including information transmitted through war stories and other mediums). Indeed, previous findings indicate BSOs often employ discretion as a response to new complexities generated by automation (Côté-Boucher 2013, p. 178-182). Côté-Boucher (2016) explores how officer decision-making is impacted by organizational change, particularly in terms of risk-based targeting technologies. Additionally, Côté-Boucher (2013, p. 366) demonstrates how officers can shape border control priorities through their use of discretion as well as unions, lobbying efforts, and through the media. However, future research involving qualitative interviews with BSOs will necessitate determining specifically how officers generate enforcement priorities at the frontline, how these prioritizations developed, and, most importantly, whether and to what extent these priorities differ from or pose a challenge to those priorities identified in training and other identified governance technologies.

Training and Governance of Social Interactions and Perceptions

Given that a significant portion of BSO duties involve face-to-face interactions with members of the public, it may be alarming to discover that officer training provides very little direct instruction on social interactions. Despite 'effective interactive communication' being the fourth most popular competency (listed 21 times) across POERT modules (and following only legislation, policies, and procedures – 29 times – analytical thinking – 28 times – and information seeking skills – 28 times), critical discourse analysis identified tangible examples of such instruction in just four of the twenty-one modules: People at Risk, Customs/Criminal Code Arrest/Detention and Personal Search, Search and Seizure under IRPA, and primarily in the Secondary Questioning module. When instruction is provided, information is largely procedural and designed almost exclusively for enforcement or intelligence-gathering purposes. For

example, s. 1.5 subsection 9 of the Secondary Questioning module emphasizes 'strong

communication skills' only to the extent that it may be used for the purposes of report writing for

court and intelligence gathering specifically:

> The interviewer must be able to prepare and present written and oral reports in a
> clear, complete, concise, and accurate manner. Often an interview is not an end
> itself. Its full value may only be realized with the timely dissemination of the
> obtained information, in a usable form, to the appropriate people or agencies (p.
> 11).

Even in terms of discussing what officers should avoid in terms of communications (i.e.

inappropriate word choice, lack of objectivity, loss of self-control, stereotyping, and

partisanship), BSOs are instructed to follow the guidelines because they facilitate greater access

to information and allow officers to gauge the truthfulness of travellers. For example, s. 1.6.5

'Emotional Factors' in the Secondary Questioning POERT training module states:

> Your emotional state can impact the effectiveness of an interview.
>
> We all have days when we are upset, tired, annoyed, or are affected by any
> number of other emotions….
>
> Be aware of your state of mind and do your best to put aside your personal
> problems so that you can focus on the task at hand.
>
> Our goal is to:
>
> - Project a sympathetic, friendly, and compassionate personality image.
> - Win the subject's trust and create a conversational rapport.
> - Create a psychological atmosphere that will facilitate confessing, not one
>   that would discourage a confession (p. 25).

Therefore, maintaining a professional image is only promoted insofar as it is designed to create

the type of atmosphere that is conducive to inducing a confession from an individual during an

interview. Similarly, s. 5.4.10 'Systematic approach for disrobement of persons' in the

Customs/Criminal Code Arrest / Detention and Personal Search POERT training module

requires officers to act professionally and with courtesy during personal searches (otherwise

known as 'strip searches'), showing empathy, answering questions politely, and refraining from making any 'unnecessary comments or attempting humour with the traveller' (p. 76-77). Such requirements are made mostly to facilitate completion of the search and avoid combative reactions from subjects.

Additionally, effective interaction is almost always couched as being natural or innate. For instance, s. 1.5 'Qualities of an effective interviewer' of the Secondary Questioning POERT module states:

> A good interviewer should have an interest in human nature and a personality
> that enables them to gain the co-operation of the subject. These qualities, and the
> following desirable character traits, are natural in some interviewers, but where
> there is a deficiency it can usually be corrected if the interviewer is willing to
> devote enough time to study and practice (p. 9).

It is generally unclear, however, when trainees would have time to refine any 'personality deficiencies' and gain an interest in human nature given such instruction is not provided by CBSA. Other sections of the Secondary Questioning module contain instruction on communicating with what could be called 'special populations'. For example, s. 3.2 discusses 'guidelines to follow when interviewing a child', including:

> Adopt a less formal line of questioning in order to avoid frightening or
> intimidating a child by using language the child can understand… Try to speak
> at the child's level. Avoid talking down to them… End your interview with a
> child on a positive and supportive note and with an explanation of why you
> asked the questions (p. 25).

These guidelines are, generally speaking, vague and do not provide specific instructions or examples of how to achieve stated goals (the ability to speak to a child in the proposed way is assumed to be natural). In terms of s. 5.2 regarding 'communicating with people who have disabilities', the module states:

> If you wish to talk to a person with a hearing disability, touch his or her shoulder
> or arm lightly or wave your hand. This is the equivalent of 'Excuse me'. Always

communicate directly with the person with a hearing disability, even when he or she is accompanied by an interpreter. When the individual is not accompanied by an interpreter, determine how you can best facilitate communication (p. 33).

Again, instructions provided are fairly vague and a 'toolkit' for communication is largely not provided to the BSO in the training module, leaving it up to the BSO to discover on the frontline how to best facilitate communication with a hearing disabled person in the absence of a translator. The training module regarding People at Risk similarly instructs officers to be 'sensitive to the personal situation of suspected [trafficking in persons] victims… proceed with extreme tact and sensitivity' (p. 8-11). Again, a toolkit of communication with specific instructions and examples is not provided. Rather, it is assumed that officers innately understand how to be tactful and show the appropriate level of sensitivity to victims. Interestingly, such communication considerations are never made for refugee claimants who may similarly be struggling with emotional and psychological distress as a result of persecution, danger, or war in their home countries, perhaps establishing a dichotomy (in training at least) between those victims deserving of compassion (trafficked persons) and 'others' undeserving of empathy (refugees seeking asylum).

Lastly, a training module entitled 'Overview of Secondary' makes reference to a vague 'educative role' BSOs should play in relation to the public. However, details are not provided regarding when or how BSOs should act as educators or gain skills necessary to become effective teachers. Details are also not provided regarding the most effective techniques for educating members of the public, and such activity is (again) assumed to be an innate ability in the training documents.

While more recent OITP training documents contain additional communication training, effective interaction and communication are still largely couched in terms of CBSA's

enforcement and intelligence-gathering mandate. Such communication training is mostly found in two modules: 1) Interviewing Techniques and 2) Client Service. The former contains instruction on how officers should interview members of the public, how active listening techniques can aide in amassing information, how officers can best detect deception in answers through both verbal and non-verbal indicators, and how methods of communication and questioning can lead to compliant and receptive interviewees. In the latter 'Client Service' module, good client service (via communication) is necessitated as a way of making BSO duties easier given travellers will be 'calm' and 'cooperative', allowing the officer to avoid court challenges based on their perceived behaviour, and facilitating the flow of travellers such that the officer may 'concentrate on high-risk persons or goods' (p. 7).

While the examined legislation, D Memoranda, and Immigration Enforcement Manual contain no information regarding interacting with travellers specifically, the CBSA Customs Enforcement Manual makes fifteen such references. Again, such instructions are largely constructed in terms of fulfilling an enforcement role. For instance, Part 2 Chapter 3 Firearms and Weapons states:

> 29. To establish this knowledge fact, the CBSA officer, as part of the primary examination will specifically ask the traveller if he/she is carrying any weapon such as pepper spray, mace or knives and advise them of the prohibited status of such weapons. In many instances, travellers may not realize that certain items are prohibited and they are not intentionally trying to smuggle them into Canada (p. 5).

In this sense, choice of language is identified as important in terms of interdicting goods given that travellers may not understand what vague terms like 'weapons' mean without specific examples, which may ultimately negatively impact interdiction, enforcement, and subsequent convictions. Even in terms of communicating with victims of trafficking in persons (VTIPs),

effective communication is defined in terms of conducting an interview in order to establish

criminality of the trafficker:

> Engage in as little questioning as possible, and conduct your interaction with the individual in a non-confrontational manner. Use non-threatening body language. Listen to the VTIP's story and realize that the truth may take some time to surface as these victims and their families are threatened with violence in the event that they cooperate with the police. Should the officer encounter resistance, questioning should be put on hold (Part 2 Chapter 15, p. 2).

This focus on communication for the purposes of enforcement and intelligence-gathering is

confirmed in the POERT module Secondary Questioning, which states, 'The reason we interview

is to obtain and/or confirm information to make accurate decisions on people and goods' (p. 2).

The document subsequently clarifies just what an 'interview' entails, stating, 'An interview

occurs anytime a BSO interacts with a traveller' (p. 2). In essence then, according to CBSA

training documents and manuals, potentially any and all interactions between BSOs and

members of the travelling public are understood as 'interviews' designed to elicit information

necessary to make enforcement and admissibility decisions.

Sections of the People Processing Manual related to communication include: Part 1

Chapter 3 Diffusion Techniques, Part 1 Chapter 4 Awareness Issues, Part 2 Chapter 1 Primary

Questioning and Immigration Referrals, and Part 2 Chapter 2 *Our Missing Children* Program.

Once again, communication is largely understood in enforcement terms. For example, a section

in Part 1 Chapter 3 states: 'Communication techniques used to reduce the anger and hostility of

an individual are known as defusion (*sic*) techniques. The objective is not to change the other

person, but to calm the person to a level where the border services officer can perform his or her

job' (p. 10). Training similar to this is also provided in officer use of force modules. Another

section in Part 2 Chapter 1 reads: 'In conducting the primary interview in the highway mode, the

officer at [the primary inspection line] must ensure that every person is given an opportunity to

make a full and complete declaration. Questioning styles such as "Anything back?" for returning residents or "Where to today?" for non-residents are to be avoided' (p. 52).

It is interesting to note that most of the information contained in manuals on interacting with members of the public is also found elsewhere (i.e. training documents) and therefore is not necessarily original or unique. Nonetheless, specific communication instructions for BSOs are provided in only four of the sixty-seven chapters of the People Processing Manual (6% of chapters) or about 15 total pages of specific instruction on how to communicate with members of the travelling public over 471 pages (3% of all material covered). Eight of these 15 pages deal specifically with communicating under 'special' circumstances, mostly related to communicating with people with disabilities (6 pages) and questioning suspected abducted children (2 pages). The rest of the People Processing Manual is reserved for identifying how officers should process travellers in different modes (land, sea, air), the CANPASS program, personal importations, classification of goods, tariffs, the importation of vehicles, and various other topics not pertaining directly to communication with travellers. In short, the People Processing Manual is more concerned with (as its title suggests) 'processing' than it is about officer interactions with members of the travelling public.

In fact, of all the training and other documents examined (over 3700 pages of information), only about 26 pages (less than 1% of all information covered) include 'how to communicate' or 'how to interact' guides for officers not specifically related to gaining compliance of travellers or administering the enforcement or intelligence-gathering mandates of the Agency. Eleven of these pages were located in the new 'Client Service' OITP module under fourteen sub-headings, including: 2.4 Courtesy, 3.1 How Communication Works, 3.2 Your Communication Style, 3.3 Communication Barriers, 4.1 What is a Difficult Situation?, 4.2

Communicating in Difficult Situations, 4.3.1 Dealing with Emotional Travellers or Situations, and 4.3.2 Dealing with Travellers who Oppose, Provoke or Challenge You. Therefore, most officers currently on the frontline did not receive this instruction as part of POERT. Interestingly, while the 'Client Service' OITP module is the primary interaction lesson provided to BSOs, CBSA projects the lesson will take just 4 hours and 30 minutes of the 18 weeks recruits are trained and tested at the CBSA College in Rigaud, Quebec (i.e. about 0.6% of all time spent training). As mentioned above, an additional fifteen pages of communication guidelines were located in the People Processing Manual. Even when including enforcement or intelligence-gathering interaction instruction with the above findings, a grand total of about 95 pages of information (2.6% of all information examined) contain any interaction or communication content whatsoever.

Regardless of which metric above you choose to consider, a very small fraction of all BSO training, frontline manuals, public policy, and other documents prepare BSOs in any way for interacting with the travelling public on the frontline. This stands in stark contrast with the vast amount of time (likely the majority of their careers) BSOs will spend interacting with members of the travelling public within an inordinately social occupation. Furthermore, POERT modules (and presumably OITP modules as well) display a systematic bias towards considering communication and social interaction as tools CBSA officers may use towards eliciting confessions, gathering intelligence, and ultimately producing enforcement actions. In this way, officer training universally portrays border interactions as 'security moments' designed to fulfill security mandates. This reflects much of the aforementioned findings from the policing literature, namely, officers receive training that emphasizes their role as law enforcers within a highly militaristic and bureaucratic structure, while instruction in potentially more progressive

roles are effectively ignored or do not translate to the frontline (Conti and Nolan 2005, Chappell and Lanza-Kaduce 2010, Conti and Doreian 2014). While the securitization of border activities and interactions is, of course, palpable and inescapable at the physical border, it is likely the case that the vast majority of interactions between BSOs and members of the travelling public are inherently mundane in nature and ultimately do not elicit confessions or information designed to fulfill an intelligence or enforcement mandate. In fact, we know the vast majority of interactions at the border do *not* lead to enforcement or intelligence-gathering activities at all. In the 2013-2014 fiscal year, only 2.97% of all examined individuals were inadmissible for customs or immigration reasons (CBSA 2014c:36). Additionally, out of the over 100 million travellers and 14 million commercial importations BSOs processed in that year (CBSA 2014c, p. 1) only about 1.3% of all individuals and 3.17% of all commercial goods examined resulted in customs infractions or enforcement actions (CBSA 2014c, p. 36).

Furthermore, trusted traveller programs like NEXUS in North America create comparatively relaxed border social interactions that can hardly be referred to as 'security moments' designed to elicit information or lead to enforcement actions. In programs such as NEXUS, the vast majority of information is provided upstream by the traveller at the time of the application process, and subsequent interactions at the physical border can only be described as a 'formality' rather than as an 'interview'. Indeed, in 2013-2014, 98.78% of all trusted traveller members were found to be in compliance with border legislation (CBSA 2014c, p. 31). In short, while officer training, manuals, and other documents conjure up an image of a 'wild west' of frontline border security for officers and recruits, in actuality security moments may in fact be few and far between amidst a vast ocean of routine social interactions between BSOs and travellers.

In conclusion, while (perhaps) preparing BSOs adequately for their enforcement and intelligence duties, CBSA training and other documents leave officers without the tools necessary for the non-securitized – or perhaps 'softer' side – of border work, such as the 'humanitarian border' identified by Walters (2011) or the vague 'educative' role promoted by the Agency itself. Findings in this article indicate that BSOs are arguably undertrained and therefore ill-prepared to interact with any number of humanitarian crisis cases, asylum seekers, victims of trafficking, abducted children, people with disabilities, travellers requiring instruction on a variety of border-related topics, travellers simply importing goods and paying taxes, emotional or angry travellers not requiring use of force options, and other equally important duties and scenarios beyond security and intelligence. As such, BSO training effectively ignores the fact the BSO occupation is a form of 'emotional labor' in which officers are responsible for projecting a standardized affect (confidence, knowledgeability, even-temper, professionalism, and so forth) while simultaneously managing the emotions of travellers they interact with (see Hochschild 1983). Such findings also reflect findings from the policing literature that police training academies often focus on high-risk, low-probability training (i.e. use of force training) while simultaneously neglecting the 'softer side' of police work (i.e. communication, de-escalation, community engagement, and so forth). (Conti and Nolan 2005, Chappell and Lanza-Kaduce 2010, Conti and Doreian 2014, Rahr and Rice 2015). Future research should consider how increased automation of border governance practices further intensifies this gulf in the ability for BSOs to successfully interact with the travelling public in *both* securitized *and* non-securitized moments. Research will also need to consider how the BSO occupation fits within the 'sociology of work' (Hughes 1958).

Conclusion

While much research has focused on examining overarching frontline border security and migration-related practices as well as associated public policy, very little research has considered how border officers are socialized through training and organizational governance technologies. While the policing literature is rife with examinations of police officer socialization, the border literature has much work to do in this regard. Border research has also not considered how socialization contributes to officer perceptions related to border security generally, and policing and interacting with of members of the public specifically. This article ultimately adds to the literature by carrying forward the work of Karine Côté-Boucher and others in examining the sociology of frontline border work. The article accomplished this by providing the first examination of the full extent of governance technologies designed to mediate officer decisions and social interactions on the frontline of enforcement. This was achieved by conducting a Foucauldian discourse analysis of the previously unexamined Canada Border Services Agency BSO Port of Entry Recruitment Training (POERT) program, relevant modules from the more recent Officer Induction Training Program (OITP), manuals and other documents employed by officers on the frontline, as well as Canadian public policy in considering CBSA organizational shifts, how officers are instructed to interact with the public, and the prioritization of duties related to the public.

Findings indicate that organizational governance shifts over the course of the last three decades within CBSA have shifted priorities from tax and duty collection to an agency that deals (at least in principle) primarily in national security, criminal enforcement, and intelligence. These shifts have resulted in a concomitant shift in officer duties and officer worldview in that

conceptualizations have undoubtedly shifted from policing a taxpaying public to dealing with a travelling public increasingly characterized as dangerous, unpredictable, and requiring securitization. Findings also identified the training and organizational governance technologies designed to manage frontline BSOs, and indicated that a combination of training documents, manuals, public policy, and bifurcated national and regional governance hierarchy serves to enable, support, and constrain BSO frontline duties, public interactions, as well as potentially perceptions.

Additional findings indicate that the *Customs Act* and *IRPA* are prioritized as the two most important legislative features of the technologies governing the actions of BSOs on the frontline of enforcement. Furthermore, prioritization of duties ultimately unfolds across training documents, manuals, and public policy to 'securitize' certain aspects of BSO duties, including duties primarily related to banned commodities and goods, immigration enforcement, banned criminal activities, and, to a lesser extent, the payment of duties and taxes. Due to the lack of prioritization information offered to officers, it is possible that BSOs also develop collective prioritizations through interacting with the travelling public on the frontline of enforcement (as the policing literature also suggests in terms of public police officers). This theory will require testing in future research.

Finally, discourse analysis of officer training, manuals, and other documents revealed that BSOs receive very little training related to interacting with members of the travelling public on the frontline. When such training is infrequently provided, officers largely receive instructions only insofar as they serve to support officers in gathering information and collecting intelligence necessary to complete enforcement actions. Collectively, such systematic bias towards portraying the border as the 'wild west of frontline security' vis-à-vis CBSA governance shifts,

the training and governance technologies, as well as in other manuals and documents ultimately produces officer worldviews and social interactions that are rooted exclusively in security provision while leaving BSOs largely unable to handle other 'soft' types of public interactions that regularly occur at the border. This reflects prior research in the policing literature and also suggests the BSO occupation is not framed as a form of 'emotional labour' (Hochschild 1983) in training. Future research should further examine the BSO occupation within the 'sociology of work' (Hughes 1958) in relation to other similar occupations to test these conclusions.

This article is inherently limited in terms of the researcher not yet having direct access from CBSA to examine how social interactions between BSOs and members of the travelling public actually unfold at the border, as well as whether and to what extent officers develop collective enforcement priorities and styles of social interaction irreducible to officer training and standard operating procedures found in manuals. As the policing literature suggests, officer socialization continues throughout the length of a career, and long after training has ended. In turn, it is also possible that official lessons provided to BSOs do not always translate directly into frontline border practices.

Directions for future research include comparing the findings from the Foucauldian discourse analysis above to results from qualitative interviews with frontline officers to examine whether and to what extent BSOs employ their training at the border, how priorities are (in)formed by frontline activities and social interactions with the travelling public, and whether and to what extent governance technologies actually influence social interactions as well as perceptions held by officers in relation to the public. Additionally, future research related to this project will seek to examine how a combination of organizational governance technologies as well as frontline social interactions contributes to how BSOs form and use categorizations in

classifying individuals on the frontline of enforcement. Such findings can be contrasted with

conclusions reached in this article to test whether and to what extent securitized perceptions

produced by organizational governance technologies are actually translated into categorizations

employed by officers as part of their day-to-day duties at the border. Finally, given that securing

access to government documents is a slow and tedious process, the results from this project will

be updated as additional documents become available through ATIP requests that either confirm

or lead to a revision of current findings.

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